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whenever there is a previous history of bargaining. However, when
there is no history of bargaining, these factors will be regarded more
realistically and severance will be more likely.
There is no question that the Board has the discretion to determine the appropriate bargaining unit in a severance case. The
only limitation is that their decision cannot be based on the fact
that a previous determination in favor of a broader unit had been
made.' 6 Courts will not overrule the Board's determination unless
it is arbitrary or unreasonable.' It is when the Board follows the
tendency of any administrative body which is overloaded with
work to lay down general rules and guidelines that it is in danger
of being reversed by the courts. These general rules do not always
give reasonable results when applied to the facts of a particular
case. The Board has stated that it will proceed on a case-by-case
basis in deciding what is the appropriate bargaining unit. However,
if the Board's actions in these three cases and subsequent ones are
any indication, it is in danger of returning to a doctrine not unlike
that of American Can. The Board is in danger of establishing a
rule that severance will not be granted where there is a history of
bargaining in the production and maintainance unit.
Jerry David Hogg

Torts--Effect of a Release of an Original Tort Feasor
Upon the Malpractice of Attending Physician
P suffered severe injuries as a result of an automobile accident. D
a specialist in plastic surgery, was engaged by P for treatment of
his facial injuries. P commenced an action against the original tortfeasor which was settled by the entry of a consent judgment.'
Subsequently P discovered that the series of reconstructive opera16 Labor Management Relations Act § 9(b) (2), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1965).
'1 NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959);
Hotel Employees Local No. 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
'The court considered the consent judgement the same as a release.
This comment will likewise treat it as a release without discussion and consider only the problems connected with releases as a bar to an action against
negligent physican.
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tions by D, both before and after the original settlement, was
negligently performed and commenced a malpractice action against
D. The jury returned a verdict for P. Held, affirmed. A strong
sense of justice requires following the modem trend in judicial
decisions whereby a release by an injured party of the one responsible for the original injury does not of itself preclude an action
by the injured person against a physician for the negligent treatment of the injury. The parties must intend the release to be full
compensation for P's total injuries; thus, if the malpractice is discovered after the release, the parties could not possibly have
intended this to be in full compensation thereof. DeNike v. Mowery, 418 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1966).
It is almost a universal rule that if an injured person uses ordinary
care in selecting a physician, then the law regards an injury resulting from mistakes of the physician or his want of skill, as a part of
the immediate and direct damages which naturally flow from the
original injury.' The law regards the negligence of the one who
caused the original injury as the proximate cause of the damages
flowing from the negligence of the physician, and holds him liable
therefor.' Consequently courts have held that a release of the
original tortfeasor must release the physician because if the one
liable for the whole claim is released, then the entire claim is
extinguished.4 The underlying theory is that there should be only
one satisfaction for the same injury.5 It is presumed that the
negligence of the physician could have been and was included in
the action against the original tortfeasor and was therefore included
in the settlement and release of the original tortfeasor.6 The presumption is irrebuttable.'
In the case where the physician's negligence is subsequent to
that of the original tortfeasor, they are properly labeled sucessive
2

Mier v. Yoho, 114 W. Va. 248, 171 S.E. 535 (1933).

4

Ibid.

3

E.g., Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943); Feinstone v. Allison Hosp., Inc., 106 Fla. 302, 143 So. 251 (1932); Keown v.
Young, 129 Kan. 563, 283 Pac. 511 (1930); Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn.
485, 239 N.W. 233 (1931); Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487
(1934).
5 Edmonson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587, 151 S.E. 114 (1929); Charles
T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W. 233 (1931); Milks v McIver,
supra note 4; Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 129 At. 107 (1937).
6 Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
7

Tbid.
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tortfeasors8 and not joint tortfeasors.9 However, the majority of
courts holding that a release of the tortfeasor is a bar to an action
against the negligent physician treat the independent wrongdoers
as joint torifeasors or apply, by analogy, the common law principal
that the release of one joint torifeasor releases all joint tortfeasors.'*
The view that a release is a bar has been severly criticized by
text writers who advocate that "a plaintiff should never be compelled to surrender his cause of action against any wrongdoer
unless he has intentionally done so, or unless he has received such
full compensation that he is no longer entitled to maintain it.""
However, it still remains the majority view.'" In one recent decision
the issue was posed in an Oklahoma court in a case of first impression.' 3 The court set forth the majority and minority rules,
cited all the jurisdictions adopting the majority rule, and apparently
feeling the majority view was overwhelming, concluded that they
would follow the majority rule without evaluating the relative
merits of either rule. Conversely, a Nevada court in a case of first
impression did evaluate the merits of each view and sided with the
minority, stating that the minority cases were better reasoned.' 4
Several jurisdictions have overruled precedent and adopted the
minority view."
8 Hansen v. Collett, 79 Nev. 159, 380 P.2d 301 (1963).
9 Mier v. Yoho, 114 W. Va. 248, 171 S.E. 535 (1933). This was of
special significance in this case because if the physican and the original tortfeasor had been considered joint tortfeasors then the release would not have
been a bar to the action under W. Va. Code ch. 55, art. 7, § 12 (Michie 1966)
which provides that a release of a joint tortfeasor is not a bar to an action
against the other joint tortfeasor. See Hardin v. New York Cent. R.R., 145
W. Va.
676, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960).
10 Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944).
" IRossE, TORTS § 46, (3d ed. 1964). See also Havighurst, The Effect
of a Settlement with One Co-Obligor Upon the Obligation of the Others,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 23 (1959), Wigmore, Release to One Joint-Tortfeasor, 17
IL.. L. REv. 563 (1923).
12 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955).
'3 Farrah v. Wolfe, 357 P.2d 1005 (Old. 1960).
'4 Hansen v. Collett, 79 Nev. 159, 380 P.2d 301 (1963).
Is E.g., Selby v. Kuhns, 345 Mass. 600, 188 N.E.2d 861 (1963), overruling Vatalaro v. Thomas, 262 Mass. .383, 160 N.E. 269 (1928); Coullard
v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958), over
ruling Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 239 N.W. 233 (1931); Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958), overruling Adam v. DeYoe, 11
NJ. Misc. 319, 166 Ati. 485 (1933), overruling Milks v. Mclver, 264 N.Y. 267,
190 N.E. 487 (1934); Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100 236 N.Y.S.2d 953,
187 N.E.2d 556 (1963)- Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860
(1955), overruling Retehe v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N.W. 756 (1927)
and Hooyman v. Reeve, 168 Wis. 420, 170 N.W. 282 (1919).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 16
CASE COMMENTS

1967]

The minority view takes the position that a release against the
original wrongdoer is not a bar to an action unless there has been
full compensation for all injuries including the malpractice.' 6 In
Wheat v. Carter'" the physician burned the plaintiff with x-ray.
Thereafter, the plaintiff settled with and released the original tortfeasor.'" The court stated that since the reason for the position
that such a release bars recovery is that it is inequitable to permit
one who has been fully compensated for his loss to recover compensation a second time, the true question was whether the injured
person had already been compensated for the loss he sustained as
a result of the use of the x-ray and not whether the one responsible
for the original injury might have been liable for the loss. 9 The
release is not in and of itself a bar to a malpractice suit unless the
plaintiff had already been compensated for that loss, in which case
it was the fact of the compensation in itself which constituted the
bar and not the release.20
The court in the DeNike case was faced with the prior precedent
n 2
of Martin v. Cunningham
' which had clearly put the state in the
majority position. In the Martin case the plaintiff was fully aware
of the malpractice when he signed a release with the original tortfeasor. In the DeNike case the malpractice was not known until
after the release of the original wrongdoer. Thus, the court distinguished the Martin case and stated that there was no question
that the intention was not to release the surgeon as neither party
was aware of the malpractice at the time of the release. The court
adopted the rule that a release by an injured party of the one
responsible for the original injury does not of itself preclude an
action against a physician or surgeon for negligent treatment of the

injury.
Although the court maintained that it did not overrule the Martin
case, this is a questionable conclusion. While admittedly the two
cases are distinguishable, the court has changed the rule to depend
on the intent of the parties when the release is executed. This is
' 6 Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654 150 P.2d 876 (1944); Wheat v.

Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 Ad. 602 (1919); Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372,
146 A.2d 676 (1958).
1779 N.H. 150, 106 Atl. 602 (1919).
18

Ibid.

19 Ibid.
20

1bid.

21 93 Wash. 517, 161 P. 355 (1916).
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in fact the minority rule. It was easier for the court to adopt the
minority view in this case since the malpractice was discovered
after the release and the court could easily find that the plaintiff
did not intend to release the physician. However, under the rule
adopted in the instant case, a plaintiff who signs a release while
aware of the malpractice could still show that he did not intend
to release the physician for his negligence even though he was fully
aware of it at the time of the release as in the Martin case. It
appears that the court was somewhat reluctant to announce the
overruling of a prior precedent, but its net effect was to do so. 2
The court in the principal case cites the New York decision of
3 for the leading authority
Derby v. Prewit-9
of the modem trend.
The fact pattern in the New York decision is almost identical to the
principal case. The malpractice was discovered after the release,
and the court concluded that the parties did not intend to release
the physician since the wrong was discovered after the release was
executed. The New York court had the decision of Milks v.
Mclver, 4 a leading case for the majority view, as precedent. The
court, as in the principal case, distinguished Milks on the ground
that the plaintiff was fully aware of the malpractice at the time
of the release. While in Milks the plaintiff may have been aware of
the malpractice, he strongly contended that he did not intend to
release the physician, but the court held the release was a bar.
In Derby the court stated that the rule that a settlement with one
of the tortfeasors represents a full satisfaction of the entire claim and
that any further recovery would involve double recovery for the
same injury does not make sense." Irrebuttable presumptions have
their place in the law but only where public policy demands that
inquiry cease.26 The court thus changed from an irrebuttable pre22 The same argument used in the principal case was attempted in Manifort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Ops. 440, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 380, 111 N.E.2d 629
(1951) where the facts in the prior Ohio decision of Tanner v. Espey, 128
Ohio St. 82, 190 N.E. 229 (1934) were similiar to the Martin case, i.e., the
malpractice occurred before the release. The plaintiff argued that the rule
would not apply where the malpractice occurred subsequent to the settlement. The court held that it is clear that the application of the majority rule
is not limited to such a situation. The test is wthether the injuries caused by
the negligence of the surgeon are merely an aggravation of the original injury
and are the proximate result of the negligence of the original tortfeasor.
23 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187 N.E.2d 556 (1963).
24 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 482 (1934).
25 Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187 N.E.2d 556
(1963).
26 Ibid.
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sumption to a rebuttable presumption." It maintained that it did
not overrule the Milks decision, but in supporting its decision the
court cited cases which applied the minority view.28 In commenting
on this decision, writers have stated that Milks is overruled.29 This
view is supported by a recent decision in New York subsequent to
Derby where the plaintiff was aware of the malpractice at the time
of the release (the situation as in Milks) and the court followed the
minority view stating that the fact to be determined with respect
to the settlement of the action is whether such settlement actually
constituted satisfaction of the damages caused only by the wrong
of the original tortfeasor or whether the settlement was intended
to be in full satisfaction of all the damage caused by the original
and the subsequent tortfeasor 3 The courts have stated that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the settlement did not reflect full satisfaction of the original and the aggravated injuries.'
The decision in Derby was 4-3 with a strong dissent critical of the
overruling of an established precedent without warning to the
bench and bar. The dissent suggested that the solution would be
to change the law by legislation if the change was desired. This is
a sensible solution which has been adopted in North Carolina.2
The position which the West Virginia Supreme Court would
take on this question is not clear. In Mier v. Yoho33 the plaintiff
was aware of the malpractice when he released the original tortfeasor. The court citing both Milks v. McIver 4 and Martin v. Cunningham held that where the aggravated conditions due to mal2731
FoRDHA
28

L. REv. 836, 838 (1962).

Among cases cited were Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d
876 (1944); Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 Alt. 602 (1919) Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958).
2927 ALBANY L. Rlv. 231 (1963); 31 FoRDnAn
L. REv. 836 (1962).
30
Risk v. County of Nassau, 262 N.Y.S.2d 56 (App Div 1965).
31
1Ibid. This is the view taken by most courts followi the minority
view. But see Daily v. Somherg, 28 N.J. 372 146 A.2d 176 (1958) where the
the burden on the claiming the release is a bar.
Court32placed
N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-540.1
The compromise, settlement or release of a cause of action against a person responsible for a personal injury to another shall not operate as a bar
to an action by the injured party against a physican or surgeon or other
professional practitioner treating such injury for the negligent treatment
thereof, unless the express terms of the compromise, settlement or release
agreemnt given by the injured party to the person responsible for the initial

injury provide otherwise.'
33 114
34264

W. Va. 248, 171 S.E. 535 (1933).
N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934).
35 93 Wash. 517, 161 P. 355 (1916).
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treatment by the physician appear to have been known to the
parties at the time of the release and the settlement was clearly
made with a view to covering all these elements of damage, the
release is a bar. The court stated it is a well settled doctrine of
the law that complete satisfaction for an injury received from one
person in consideration of his release operates to discharge all who
are liable therefor, whether they be joint or several wrongdoers.
The court then added, in dicta, that it appeared that the alleged
malpractice of the defendants was an element then being considered, but even if it was not then considered, the general rule is
the same. The court, in dicta, indicated that West Virginia is in
the majority and has been cited by other jurisdictions as being in
the majority.
In the following year a similiar case came before the court, 6
but the distinguishing factor was that the malpractice was subsequent to the release. The physician relied on the Mier case and
pleaded the release to the original tortfeasor as a bar, but the court
struck down this defense stating that a person does not anticipate
that those called upon to treat his injury will so negligently perform
their service as to aggravate the condition. This case seems to
place West Virginia in the minority position.
Louis S. Southworth, 11

Workmen's Compensation-Dual Capacity Doctrine
Claimant, president and sole stockholder of a corporation, was
seriously injured in an automobile accident while returning from
a business appointment in the interest of the corporation, in the
capacity of a traveling salesman. An Industrial Commissioner's
award of workmen's compensation to him was affirmed by the
circuit court and the employer appeals. Held, affirmed. Where
the executive officer and sole stockholder of a sales corporation
was performing at the time of his injury in the capacity of a
traveling salesman, he was an employee within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and was allowed recovery for such
injuries. B. W. Sales Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 35 IMI. 2d 418, 220
N.E.2d 405 (1966).
36

Conley v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 175, 174 S.E. 883 (1934).
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